We show how to model and verify a concurrent program using the Coq proof assistant. The program in question is an existing mail server written in Java. The approach we take is to use an original library that provides a language for modeling, a logic, and lemmas for verification of concurrent programs. First, we report on the modeling of the mail server. Using the language provided by the library, we build a model by (1) translating the original program and (2) building appropriate abstractions to model its environment. Second, we report on the verification of a property of the mail server. We compare this library-based approach with an alternative approach that directly appeals to the Coq language and logic for modeling and specification. We show that the library-based approach has many advantages. In particular, non-functional aspects (communications, non-determinism, multi-threading) are handled directly by the library and therefore do not require complicated modeling. Also, the model can be directly run using existing compilers or virtual machines, thus providing us with a certified implementation of the mail server.
Introduction
Mechanical verification of programs is important to guarantee their correctness. Among the tools for such verifications, proof assistants are particularly attractive, because they combine inductive reasoning with automation, what makes them more widely applicable, compared to fully automated tools such as model checkers 7) . Proof assistants cannot in general be used directly for program verification. The main reason is that programs may use programming constructs the proof assistant is unaware of. For instance, verification of concurrent programs in a proof assistant based on the λ-calculus requires an additional machinery to handle typical concurrency concepts such as non-determinism.
We have been developing a library 2) to enable mechanical verification of concurrent programs in the Coq proof assistant. This library (called applπ, which stands for "applied π-calculus") provides a modeling language, a specification language, and lemmas for verification of realistic concurrent programs. This paper reports on the modeling and verification of a concurrent program using the applπ library. More precisely, we model an existing mail server 17) and we verify that it cor- † Department of Computer Science, The University of Tokyo † † Department of Computer Science, Tokyo Institute of Technology rectly handles requests from clients. In fact, we have already performed this verification, but using a different approach 1) that directly appeals to the Coq language and logic for modeling and verification. Our main contribution is to show the advantages of using the applπ library for the verification of concurrent programs. In particular, we illustrate that modeling is simplified because typical concurrency concepts (communications, non-determinism, multi-threading) are handled by the library and does not require complicated modeling. In addition, it is possible to run the model using existing compilers or virtual machines, thus providing us with a certified implementation of the mail server. We believe that these advantages reinforce confidence in the verification. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we give an overview of the Coq proof assistant and the applπ library. In Section 3, we describe our case study. In Section 4, we explain how we model the original program into a concurrent model written with the applπ library. In Section 5, we explain how we model the environment of the program. In Section 6, we report on the mechanical verification in itself. In Section 7, we conclude and list related and future work.
Preliminaries

The Coq Proof Assistant
The Coq proof assistant is the implementation of a typed λ-calculus (namely the Cal-culus of Inductive Constructions 12) ) that can be used to represent datatypes, functions, and predicates, and therefore encode, among others, computer languages and proof systems. In this paper, we use Coq for both implementation and notation. In this section, we give an overview of the Coq proof assistant. Intuitively, it can be thought as an ML-like language with a rich type system.
In Coq, datatypes are represented by inductive types. For example, natural numbers are defined as follows: This definition introduces the type of natural numbers nat, which is itself of type Set, a Coq built-in type for datatypes. O and S are the constructors for natural numbers; observe that S is functional. The intent is that the constructor O represents the natural 0, (S O) represents the natural 1, etc.
Records are represented by a syntax similar to most programming languages. For example, two-dimensional points can be defined as follows:
Record point : Set := pt{ x: nat; y: nat}.
pt is the constructor for two-dimensional points, and x and y are their projection functions.
Functions are represented by λ-abstractions. For example, the function that computes the predecessor of a natural number can be defined by case analysis as follows:
where [n:nat] is the Coq syntax for λn : nat.
Predicates are represented by inductive types or functions whose resulting type is the Coq built-in type Prop. For example, the following predicate defines even natural numbers:
Inductive even : nat -> Prop := base : (even O) | step : (n:nat)(even n) -> (even (S (S n))).
The constructor base represents the fact that O is an even number, and the constructor step let us construct, from any even number n, the proof that the natural (S (S n)) is an even number. Intuitively, (n:nat) can also be thought as universal quantification.
Proof goals are stated by the keyword Lemma. For example, the following proof goal states a property of the pred function:
Lemma pred_even : (n:nat)(even n) -> (even (pred (pred n))).
Once a proof goal is stated, Coq enters an internal loop where the user is prompted to prove the goal interactively by means of pre-existing lemmas. Upon completion of the proof, the lemma is saved in Coq and is reusable for further proof developments.
The applπ Library applπ
2) is a Coq library that enables verification of concurrent programs. It provides (1) a modeling language, (2) a specification language (or logic, for short), and (3) a collection of lemmas. Using this library, it is possible to verify concurrent programs using the following approach:
( 1 ) Write a model of the concurrent program using the applπ language. ( 2 ) Write the properties of the concurrent program using the applπ logic. ( 3 ) Prove that the property holds of the model using the lemmas of the library. In the following, we give an overview of the contents of the applπ library.
The applπ modeling language is a Coq encoding of a minimal concurrent language based on the π-calculus 11) that it extends with datatypes and functions, like the Pict programming language 14) . The applπ modeling language defines two syntactic entities: channels and processes. Intuitively, processes interact with each other by exchanging values over channels.
Channels are implemented by the functional type chan. For some Coq datatype T, the type (chan T) represents the type of channels that carry data of type T. For instance, (chan nat) represents the type of channels that carry natural numbers.
The syntax of processes is implemented by the inductive type proc. It defines a set of constructors that each represents a basic process:
• zeroP represents a terminated process.
• (inP c Q), where c is a channel and Q is a function, represents a process that waits for some value v along the channel c and behaves as the process (Q v) after reception.
• (rinP c Q) intuitively represents infinitely many (inP c Q) processes in parallel. rinP stands for replicated inputs and corresponds to multi-threading.
• (outP c v Q) represents the process that
iff (sat f P) or (sat g P) is true (sat (OUTPUTS c v f) P) iff P has a subprocess (outP c v Q) such that (sat f Q) (sat (INPUTS c f) P) iff P has a subprocess (inP c Q) such that (sat f (Q v)) for any v (sat (CONSISTS f g) P)
iff P can be decomposed into P1 and P2 with (sat f P1) and (sat f P2) (tsat (STAT f) P)
iff (sat f P) (tsat (NEGT f) P)
iff (tsat f P) is false (tsat (ORT f g) P)
iff (tsat f P) or (tsat g P) is true (tsat (MAYEV f) P)
iff for some execution, we eventually have (tsat f P) (tsat (MUSTEV f) P)
iff for any execution, we eventually have (tsat f P) Fig. 2 Informal semantics of applπ logic. emits some value v along the channel c and then behaves as the process Q.
• (parP P Q) represents the parallel composition of processes P and Q.
• (nuP Q) represents a process that creates some private channel c and then behaves as (Q c). We define InAtom and OutAtom as abbreviations for input and output processes whose continuation is zeroP.
The semantics of the applπ modeling language is a binary relation between processes that formalizes in particular the notion of communication between processes. In this paper, we informally represent communications using a diagram notation.
For example, the possible communications inside the process (parP (outP c v P) (parP (inP c Q) (inP c R))) are depicted in Fig. 1 (the constructor parP is written | to save space).
The second part of the applπ library is a logic for specification of applπ programs. This logic consists of:
• a set of state formulas including propositional and spatial formulas 4) , • a satisfaction relation between state formulas and processes noted sat, • a set of temporal formulas similar to temporal logics 6) , • another satisfaction relation between temporal formulas and processes noted tsat .
The existence of two satisfaction relations is to prevent temporal formulas from being used inside spatial formulas. This is required to guarantee the soundness of some important lemmas 3) . Fig. 2 .
The informal semantics of formulas is given in
The last part of the applπ library is a collection of lemmas for verification. We defer overview of these lemmas to Section 6.2, where our case study will provide us with a concrete illustration.
The SMTP Model
In this section, we explain the SMTP model on which the mail server is based. This model is defined in the RFC 821 15) . The mail server consists of several parts, as depicted in Fig. 3 . The SMTP receiver receives mails from other mail servers and mail clients using the SMTP protocol and stores received mails in a mail queue, implemented by a file system. The SMTP sender extracts mails from the mail queue and sends them to other mail servers or mail clients using the SMTP protocol. In this paper, we are interested in the SMTP receiver part.
The SMTP protocol is depicted in Fig. 4 . An SMTP protocol session consists of commands and some mail contents sent to the mail server, that sends back replies. The client starts a session by sending the HELO command; the server replies with its identity and creates an envelope. The client sends the MAIL command to set the return path of the envelope with the address of the mail sender. The client then sends one or more RCPT commands to add addresses to the list of recipients of the envelope. The client eventually sends the DATA command, followed by the mail contents and terminated by a "dot". At any moment, it can reset the session using the RSET command, abort using the ABORT command, sends a dummy command NOOP, or closes the session with the QUIT command. For each command, the server answers with an appropriate message, possibly reporting an error.
Modeling of the Mail Server
In this section, we explain how we model the mail server written in Java using a concurrent program written in the applπ modeling language. Intuitively, modeling consists in translating Java datatypes and control structures into the applπ modeling language. This is facilitated by the fact that the applπ modeling language provides (1) Coq datatypes and control structures which are very close to their Java counterparts, and (2) concurrency primitives to handle directly communications, nondeterminism, and multi-threading (as seen in Section 2.2). In the following, we comment on the main aspects of this translation.
Datatypes
The mail server defines a number of datatypes that we directly translate into Coq inductive types. For example, the mail server defines constants to implement SMTP commands, like the HELO command:
Other SMTP commands are similarly implemented by the constants cmd mail from, cmd rcpt to, cmd data, cmd rset, cmd abort, cmd noop, cmd quit, and cmd unknown (for unknown commands). We represent these constants in Coq using the following inductive type: where the fields domain, rev, and fwd correspond to the envelope (as seen in Section 3) and the field body corresponds to the mail contents.
Communications
In the mail server, communications are implemented by means of the java.io package. For example, the input stream of SMTP commands is implemented by an instance of a subclass of the class java.io.InputStream:
Similarly, the output stream of SMTP replies is implemented by an instance of a subclass of the class java.io.OutputStream:
Input and output operations in the mail server are implemented by calls to adequate methods. For example, the method that receives an SMTP command from the input stream is implemented by the read method:
Similarly, the method that sends the SMTP reply following the HELO command is implemented by the println method:
void reply_ok_helo() throws IOException { to_client.println ("250 " + hostname + " hello"); } Translation to applπ communication primitives is direct. We represent input and output streams by channels of the appropriate type: heloc (get_helo_def heloc mailc) ) (parP (rinP mailc (get_mail_def mailc rcptc)) (parP (rinP rcptc (get_rcpt_def mailc rcptc)) (OutAtom heloc st))))))). We have seen above how to model communications between the mail server and a client. Similarly, communications between the mail server and the file system are modeled by a channel of type (chan Mail) and corresponding input and output processes.
Server State
The mail server features a number of variables (fields of Java objects) that capture its state. To represent these variables, we introduce a representation of the state of the mail server using a record that is intended to be passed around following the flow of execution: The fields in stream and to client contain the channels used for communication with the client. The fields queue dir and buf represent respectively the directory and the file that implement the mail queue. The field to fs contains the channel for communication with the file system. The field server name contains an identifier that the mail server uses for SMTP replies. The fields from domain, rev path, and fwd paths correspond to the envelope being built.
Control Structures
The mail server appeals to a wide variety of control structures. Basic control structures such as conditionals are easily translated into case analyses. However, non-terminating loops cannot be represented directly in Coq (they are rejected because they make proof checking undecidable). In the following, we explain how we translate the main loop of the mail server into the applπ modeling language. The idea is to implement it using communications with respect to replicated inputs.
The main loop of the mail server (Fig. 5 , on the left) waits for incoming requests and, upon reception of an HELO command, it enters a loop in which subsequent commands are processed. This processing of subsequent SMTP commands is ensured by methods get helo, get mail from, get rcpt to, and get data.
We represent the main loop of the mail server by means of replicated inputs that exchange the state of the mail server through a set of private channels: heloc, mailc, and rcptc (Fig. 5 , on the right). These replicated inputs are written in such a way that they emulate the flow of control of the original program. It should be observed that, even though we use replicated inputs, the resulting process represent a single thread of computation. (Multiple threads of computation will appear when composing the mail server with its environment, see next section.)
Each method called from the main loop of the mail server is modeled in a systematic way as a process. We illustrate this modeling using the example of the get helo Java method.
The Java method get helo (Fig. 6 , on the left) tries to fetch incoming HELO commands, replies appropriately, and redirects the flow of control to other methods. It is essentially a switch statement.
We represent the Java method get helo by means of the process get helo def (Fig. 6 , on the right). The switch statement is translated into a case analysis. The control flow is emulated by means of communications: break statements are replaced by communications along the heloc channel, return statements are replaced by communications along the mailc channel, etc. Each method call in the original program is translated to a call to the corresponding function resulting from the translation. Finally, successful termination is modeled by the presence of a dummy value along a special channel resultc:
Variable resultc : (chan unit). Definition succ := (OutAtom resultc tt).
(The statement Variable declares a global variable in Coq. tt is the only element of type unit.)
Modeling of the Environment
In order to verify that the mail server correctly handles client requests, we need to make some hypotheses on its environment. In particular, we assume that we perform the verification in presence of a correct client and a correct file system. The network communications and the host computer are also part of the environment of the mail server. In general, we cannot expect network communications and the host computer to be reliable.
In this section, we show how to model a correct mail client and a correct file system and the hypotheses of unreliable network communications and of an unreliable host computer.
Network Errors
We model network errors by the presence of a dummy value along a special channel IOexnc:
Variable IOexnc : (chan unit).
Network errors may occur during communications between the mail server and the mail client, and between the mail server and the file system. We therefore use the special channel IOexnc in the specification of the client and of the file system, as explained below.
Client Specification
A client is correct if it emits valid streams of SMTP commands, as specified by the RFC 821 15) . This requirement amounts to specifying the set of valid streams of SMTP commands. We render this specification by means of the predicate val in Fig. 7 .
Informally, the predicate val can be read as follows. The client emits valid streams of SMTP commands if:
• after emitting a valid HELO command it still emits valid streams of SMTP commands, as defined by the predicate val after helo (constructor say helo),
• it emits a QUIT or ABORT command (constructors say quit and say abort),
• it emits any other command such that the rest of the emission is still valid (constructor say skip). The constructor say io error does not correspond to the definition of validity of streams of SMTP commands, we add it to take into account the possibility for a network error.
Similarly, we take into account the possibility for a network error prior to emission of SMTP replies. This is rendered by the predicate ack in Fig. 8 .
The constructor ack rep corresponds to the usual situation where the SMTP reply is sent to the client, and the constructor ack rep io error corresponds to the exceptional situation where a network error prevents the emission of the SMTP reply.
Inductive ack : OutStream -> proc -> Prop := ack_rep : (y:OutStream)(P:ReplyMsg -> proc) ((x:ReplyMsg)(ack y (P x))) -> (ack (inP y P)) | ack_rep_io_error : (y:OutStream)(P:proc) (ack y P) -> (ack y (outP IOexnc tt P)). We pack above val and ack predicates into a single valid client predicate that specifies correct clients. Similarly, we define a predicate valid fs that specifies correct file systems.
System Failures
An unreliable host computer is modeled by the non-deterministic possibility for a a failure. A failure is modeled by the presence of a dummy value along a special channel failc:
Variable failc : (chan unit).
A failure may occur at any moment. We model this non-determinism by a process that nondeterministically output a dummy value along the above special channel: (The question mark ? in Coq automatically infers the corresponding type.) The possible reductions of this non-deterministic failure generator are depicted in Fig. 9 .
Formal Verification
Goal Statement
We are interested in verifying that the mail server modeled in Section 4 executed under the environment modeled in Section 5 correctly handles incoming streams of SMTP commands. In other words, we want to verify that, for any possible execution, the process formed by the parallel composition of a correct client, a correct file system, (the model of) the mail server, and a non-deterministic failure generator results in successful termination, a network error, or a system failure. Observe that the resulting process has multiple threads of computation.
The property informally stated above can be formally written using the applπ logic as follows: (Special channels resultc, IOexnc, and failc are used to observe respectively successful ter- (parP (fs tofs) (may_fail))))))) in (tsat reports_succ_or_error P). mination, network error, and failures.)
Let us write P for the process formed by the parallel composition of a correct client, a correct file system, the mail server, and a nondeterministic failure generator. The proof goal can be stated as follows:
Lemma valid_protocol: ... (tsat reports_succ_or_error P).
The complete statement is given in Fig. 10 . (Symbols nilC and & respectively represent the empty list and cons cells.)
Formal Proof
We have formally proved using Coq the goal stated above. The proof is by induction on the predicate val (excerpt in Fig. 7 ). It requires 3927 commands using the applπ library (for a 400 lines model and 200 lines specification).
An important aspect of the formal proof is how we deal with interleaving sequences of communications. Since the mail server runs in parallel with the failure generator, there are several possible execution paths that only differ by the moment when the failure generator is scheduled for execution. The proliferation of such different possible execution paths is harmful because they considerably augment the number of subgoals of the formal proof. This situation is an instance of the state-space explosion problem.
The applπ library provides lemmas that enable partial order reduction to deal with the state-space explosion problem. We illustrate the basic idea of partial order reduction with the following example. Let us consider some process P in which two communications along channels c and d are enabled, such that both communications can be executed in whatever order to reach the same process Q:
To verify a formula of the form (MUSTEV f) in this situation, it is often sufficient to explore only one execution path. More generally, partial order reduction reduces the number of execution paths to be explored for the purpose of verification to a subset representative of all the possible orderings of communications. The applπ library provides lemmas that enable partial order reduction for the applπ language and its logic 2),3) . Lemmas from the applπ library that enable partial order reduction are particularly useful to verify the mail server. Let us consider the fragment of the state space of the whole system depicted in Fig. 11 . The initial process is shortened to client|work|fs|may fail to save space. From the initial process, it is possible to perform either (1) a communication along channel i through which the client sends a first SMTP command to the mail server, leading to the process client |work |fs|may fail, or (2) one of the two communications along channel x enabled by the non-deterministic failure generator. Lemmas from the applπ library tell us that we can safely ignore the execution paths starting with the failure generator (dotted lines in Fig. 11 ), and resume verification from the process client |work |fs|may fail.
Discussion
The size of the formal proof is large but can be substantially reduced. In fact, prior to the case study presented in this paper, we had already verified the same mail server using a different approach 1) . The basic idea of this approach was to model the mail server using only
client |work |fs|may fail client |work |fs|nofailure client |work |fs|failure functional constructs provided by the Coq language. The formal proof that the mail server correctly handles client requests was almost four times smaller (1,059 commands). However, it appears that both approaches lead to essentially the same proof tree thanks to partial order reduction. Therefore, the overhead induced by the applπ library is not a fundamental issue and can be alleviated by improving automation. Despite this overhead, the verification of concurrent programs using the applπ library is still a satisfactory approach because it handles multi-threading explicitly and because it is possible to extract a runnable concurrent program from the model. The latter was not possible with our previous model 1) because it was polluted with functional constructs whose purpose was only the modeling of non-determinism. In contrast, modeling of non-deterministic failures in the applπ model does not interfere with the modeling of the original program. Consequently, it is possible to execute the code of the model as it is.
To execute the code of the model, it is possible to write a virtual machine to interpret the applπ modeling language. However, the extraction facility of Coq provides a more effective solution. This extraction facility turns Coq programs into ML programs (OCaml, Haskell, etc.) by associating to each Coq inductive type a corresponding ML datatype, to each Coq function a corresponding ML function, etc. In particular, the concurrency primitives of the applπ modeling language are extracted in the form of the constructors of the following ML datatype (we use OCaml syntax for concreteness): where the type Obj.t corresponds to channels (this is because we have only provided Coq with the type of channels, not their implementation). The idea to execute the extracted OCaml code is to pre-process it to replace each call to one of the constructor above by a call to an OCaml function that implements the appropriate semantics. In other words, given some (parameterized) type channel and a set of functions zeroP, inP, etc. that implement the semantics of the applπ modeling language, we have a complete mechanism to run models.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have explained how one can verify an existing concurrent program using a Coq library. More precisely, we gave an overview of the verification of an existing mail server written in Java using the applπ library. First, we introduced the Coq proof assistant and the applπ library. Second, we explained how to model the mail server into an applπ program. Third, we explained how to model the environment of the mail server, including modeling of system errors. Last, we reported on the formal proof that the mail server correctly handles client requests. We compared the results of verification with an alternative approach and observed that (1) the overhead induces by the applπ library can potentially be eliminated through better automation, and that (2) the applπ model is more satisfactory because in particular it can be run as it is. This case study shows that the applπ library provides us with a complete solution to write, verify, and run concurrent programs in the Coq interface.
Related Work
The issue of verification of concurrent programs in proof assistants has been addressed through formalization of the UNITY formalism 5),8), 13) . This work also includes various verifications of non-trivial concurrent programs. The originality of our case study is that we verify an existing implementation and discuss for that purpose several reusable techniques for modeling.
There exist several encodings of the π-calculus in proof assistants with accompanying libraries 9),10),16) . This work essentially focuses on verification of meta-properties of the pure π-calculus. In comparison, the applπ library is built above an applied version of the π-calculus and we focus on verification of properties of programs.
In this paper, we used a proof assistant to verify a concurrent program. Model checking is an alternative approach 7) that could have equallywell applied to verification of the mail server. The advantage of proof assistants is that they can handle directly infinite state-spaces thanks to induction, contrary to model checkers that are limited to finite state-spaces (unless one resorts to appropriate abstraction techniques). This is the reason why we investigate the usage of proof assistants to verify concurrent programs.
Future Work
We plan to tackle the issue of reducing the size of formal proofs by improving automation in the applπ library and combining interactive proofs with model checking for the applπ modeling language and its logic.
